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NOTES
TOm SWIFT AND HIS ELECTRIC ELEcToRATE: LEGISLATION To RESTRICT
ELECTION COVERAGE
I. Introduction
In their coverage of the November general elections and of the California
Republican Primary in June, the major television networks broadcast computer-
based predictions of the outcome of the Presidential election and of major local
contests. The predictions were often announced after only small percentages of the
vote had been tallied.1 The effect of these predictions, and of the announcement
of election results, in areas where polls remain open during the broadcasts, is the
subject of much concern among legislators, commentators and network officials.
Several bills are now pending before Congress which would withhold such
information from the public until all the votes are in. Two of these propose
amendments to the Communications Act of 19342 by the addition of a section 331
to part I of subchapter III. House Bill 11648, introduced by Representative Gubser
of California and now pending before the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce,3 would read as follows:
SEC. 331. On any day on which United States Senators or Representatives
or electors of President and Vice President of the United States are elected,
no station licensee shall broadcast or permit the broadcast of any prediction
of the results of any election to public office occurring on such day until all
places for voting in any such election in the continental United States
are closed.
Its counterpart in the Senate, Senate Bill 2927, introduced by Senator Mundt of
South Dakota and now before the Committee on Commerce,4 would provide:
Sac. 331. No licensee shall broadcast the results, including any opinion,
prediction, or other matter based on such results, of any election of electors
for President and Vice President of the United States or Senators or Repre-
sentatives in Congress in any State or part thereof until after the latest
official closing time of any polling place for such an election in any other
State on the same day.
Although the Senate bill would not apply to municipal, county or state elections,
as does the bill in the House, it silences the reporting of results as well as of pre-
dictions, extending the moratorium on such disclosures until after the polls have
closed in Hawaii and the Aleutian Islands.5 Both bills would render the broad-
casts subject to the Federal Communications Commission's power to make rules0
and issue cease-and-desist orders,7 and to suspend,8 revoke," and refuse renewal 0
of licenses for violations of the act.
Alternative proposals have also been offered. S. 3118, introduced by Senator
1 During the California primary, for example, the polls closed one hour earlier in Los
Angeles than in San Francisco and other northern areas. Senator Grant Sawyer of Nevada
reports that "[w]hen a Goldwater victory was announced more than half an hour before the
polls closed, many voters in both parties refused to vote. There was panic among precinct
workers on both sides and many persons changed their votes to catch the winner just as
State delegations do at conventions when a trend becomes strong." 110 Cong. Rec. 18486
(daily ed. Aug. 12, 1964) (quoted in remarks of Senator Karl Mundt).
2 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1958), as amended, 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-606 (Supp. V, 1964).
3 H.R. 11648, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
4 S. 2927, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
5 These areas are presumably meant to be excluded from the House bill's coverage by
the term "continental United States."
6 48 Stat. 1082 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (r) (1958).
7 66 Stat. 716 (1952), 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (Supp. V, 1964).
8 48 Stat. 1082 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 303(m)(1) (1958).
9 48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (Supp. V, 1964).
10 48 Stat. 1083 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1958), as amended, 47 U.S.C.
307(d) (Supp. V, 1964).
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Javits of New York, would fix a uniform closing time for polls throughout the
"several States," with adjustments for differences among the time zones."' Another
Senate bill, by Vermont's Senator Prouty, would prohibit release of information
by election officials until after the last poll had closed. 1 2 These proposals reveal
a preference that Congress avoid direct restrictions upon the subject matter that
FCC licensees may broadcast. They seem well within the clear power of Congress
to regulate the elections of its own members, of Presidents and Vice Presidents. s
The first amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press would pre-
sent no difficulty.
It is quite another matter to forbid news media to publish such information
once it has been released. In principle, the FCC may constitutionally supervise
the overall program-content broadcast by its licensees.'" Yet it has not been allowed
to censor the content of specific programs, 5 nor has Congress deemed any particular
class of news unsuitable for publication. Thus the proposed amendments seem
inconsistent with a tradition of free "press" coverage of elections which has survived
the advent of every advance in communications technology.
It is the purpose of this note to examine the constitutional context within which
these two bills are offered. If these bills depart from traditional notions of freedom
of the press, the combination of instantaneous communications and computer an-
alysis is likewise unprecedented. The fate of the proposed laws before Congress
and, ultimately, before the Supreme Court, may well depend upon the significance
attached to the novelty of the situation, and upon the validity of the claims that
the broadcasters' current practices are corruptive of the electoral process. Pending
the disclosures of reliable behavioral research and the prudential judgment of Con-
gress, it is submitted that the measures are well supported by the Constitution's dele-
gations of Congressional power, and that they will withstand objections based upon
the first amendment.
II. Sources of Congressional Power: Protection of the Franchise and of the
Electoral Process
A. Constitutional Provisions
Article I, section 2 of the Constitution adopts as the qualifications for electors
of members of the House of Representatives the qualifications required in each
state for electors of members of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.' 6
The same provision is made for Senatorial elections by the seventeenth amend-
11 S. 3118, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
12 S. 3115, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). Senator Prouty explains that his bill sets a
uniform "official" closing time, "the hour established for the closing of the last polling
place in the United States as designated by the President . . ." while state law would
govern actual voting hours. Release of information prior to the "official" hour would be
made a crime under title 18 of the United States Code. 110 Cong. Rec. 18478 (daily ed.
Aug. 12, 1964) (remarks of Senator Prouty).
13 See text accompanying notes 16-43, infra.
14 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). The constitu-
tionally permissible scope of the FCC's "supervisory" powers over program content is even now
unclear. One writer has drawn a distinction between the "composition" and "content"
of radio-communications traffic, insisting that the FCC's power extends only to the review
of a licensee's overall program and does not include "directorial" power with respect to
any given program. Barber, Competition, Free Speech and FCC Radio Network Regula-
tions, 12 GEO. WASn. L. REv. 34, 49-50 (1943). See generally Comment, 41 NEB. L. Rzv.
826 (1962); Note, 77 HARv. L. REv. 701 (1964).
15 Section 326 of the Communications Act of 1934 forbids censorship by the FCC,
and prohibits interference by it with the "right of free speech." 48 Stat. 1091 (1934), as
amended, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1958).
16 "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second
Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have theQualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature."
U.S. CONST. art I, § 2.
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ment.' 7 Once the identity of the electors is determined, they have a constitutional
right to vote in Congressional elections" which Congress may protect by appropriate
legislation.' Accordingly, Congress has acted extensively in the past to provide
both-civil and criminal sanctions against the interference with the right to vote by
election officials, by persons acting under color of law, and by private parties.'0
Current statutes dealing generally with constitutional rights have also been applied
in a variety of situations to the right to vote.20 Various provisions relating spe-
cifically to interferences with the right to vote are currently in effect.
2
'
Article I, section 4 provides that the states shall regulate the time, places and
manner of holding Congressional elections, and that Congress may make or alter
such regulations. 22 The Supreme Court has held that the power of Congress in this
area is coextensive with that of the states,2 3 viewing article I as contemplating:
a complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times and
places, but in relation to notices, registration, supervision of voting, protec-
tion of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes,
duties of *nspectors and canvassers, and maing and publication of election
returns; in short, to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and
safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the
fundamental right involved. 24
The power of Congress to regulate Presidential elections is derived from article
II, section 1, which empowers Congress to determine the time for the selection
of electors and to fix the day on which electors throughout the country shall cast
their votes. 25 The Constitution does not guarantee that they be chosen by popular
vote. The legislatures in each state decide the method of election for themselves. 28
Again, however, duly qualified electors have a constitutional right to vote which
Congress may protect.27
17 "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of tivo Senators from each
State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote.
The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most
numerous branch of the State legislatures." U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
18 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941); Swafford v. Templeton, 185
U.S. 487, 493 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1900); Ex Parte Yarbrough,
110 U.S. 651, 661 (1884).
19' The use of force, threats or other unlawful means of preventing persons from voting
or qualifying to vote at any election has been penalized. Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870,
ch. 114, § 4, Rev. Stat. § 5506 (1875). Illegal voting has also been subjected to criminal
prosecution. Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 19-20, Rev. Stat. §§ 5511-12
(1875). Both criminal and civil sanctions were directed against election officials violating
either state or federal duties in conducting Congressional elections. Enforcement Act' of
May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 2-3, 20, Rev. Stat. §§ 2005-07, 5515 (1875). All were repealed
by the Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36 (1894).
20 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1958) forbids conspiracies to threaten any citizens in the free
exercise and enjoyment of rights and privileges se'ured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States. Relatively recent cases involving the franchise include Fields v. United States,
228 F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1955) (mailing fraudulent ballots); Crolich v. United States, 196
F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1952) (casting false ballots); Prichard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326
(6th Cir.), aff'd, 339 U.S. 974 (1950) (stuffing ballot box). 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958) pun-
ishes deprivations of such rights and privileges by persons acting under color of law. Its pred-
ecessor was applied in United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944) (stuffing ballot box),
and in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (alteration of ballots).
21 E.g., 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1958), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (c),
(e), (f) (Supp. V, 1964).
22 "The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representa-
tives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may
at any time by Law, make or alter such Regulations, except as to the places of choosing
Senators." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 4.
23 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 367 (1932).
24 Id. at 366.
25 "The Congress may determine the Time of choosing the Electors, and the Day on
which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
26 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892).
27 Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
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B. Powers Inherent in the National Government
The Supreme Court has upheld regulatory legislation broader than the lan-
guage of article II alone would warrant. In Burroughs & Cannon v. United States"
the defendants were charged with violating the Federal Corrupt Practices Act,29
in that they had not reported contributions received by a political committee formed
to influence the Presidential election in more than one state. In reply to their
contention that Congress was limited to action expressly authorized by article II,
the Court stated:
To say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to
safeguard such an election from the improper use of money to influence
the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self-
protection. Congress, undoubtedly, possesses that power, as it possesses
every other power essential to preserve the departments and institutions
of the general government from impairment or destruction, whether
threatened by force or by corruption.5 0
Thus the Court has recognized that Congress, quite apart from the established
power to protect individual persons in their exercise of the franchise, and in the
absence of specific authorization to regulate the "manner of holding elections,"
has an inherent power, implicit in the Constitutional scheme, to neutralize the
effects upon the electoral process of corruptive influences exerted by persons not
involved in the mechanics of conducting elections. The idea is hardly a new one.
In 1884, the Court reviewed convictions under federal statutes punishing con-
spiracies to prevent voting in the case of Ex Parte Yarbrough.51 Having assaulted
a Negro because he voted in a Congressional election, the convicts challenged the
legislation for lack of clear constitutional authorization. The Court replied that
it was "a waste of time to seek for specific sources of the power to pass these laws,
' 2
quoting Chancellor Kent's commentary on the constitutional jurisprudence of the
United States:
"[The national government's] powers apply to those great interests which
relate to this country in its national capacity, and which depend for their
protection on the consolidation of the Union. It is clothed with the prin-
cipal attributes of political sovereignty, and it is justly deemed the guardian
of our best rights, the source of our highest civil and political duties, and
the sure means of national greatness." 1 Kent's Com. 20133
Thus is suggested an answer to one objection to the proposed amendments to
the Communications Act -that Congressional power over the "manner of holding
elections" does not embrace the reporting of results, with or without interpreta-
tion, by news media. If the objection is valid, the legislation still need not stand
solely upon Congress' power to protect the right to vote. Congress is not limited
to these alternatives, but may also legislate to preserve from impurities the processes
by which democratic institutions are maintained.
C. Applications to the Instant Legislation
In the present context, the "inherent powers" approach is not without its
difficulties. Both Yarbrough and Burroughs & Cannon dealt with legislation de-
signed to prevent active misconduct. The dangers which the Court thought Con-
gress was implicitly authorized to combat were those which threatened the polity
by force and fraud. The bills here considered silence the disclosure of predictions
and/or results irrespective of any intent to deceive, and without regard to the
soundness of the methods by which such predictions may be formulated. Further,
insofar as the bills rest theoretically upon the power to protect the right to vote,
the question may again be raised-from what may the franchise be protected? Under
various statutes, this power has been applied to an assortment of misdeeds ranging
28 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
29 43 Stat. 1070 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 244 (1958).
30 Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934).
31 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
32 Id. at 666.
33 Ibid.
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from direct physical interventions to the stuffing of ballot boxes to the enforcement
of discriminatory eligibility standards.34 However, there is no precedent for re-
stricting the nonfraudulent dissemination of election information. It is difficult
to see how the right to vote is impaired by the broadcast either of results or of
predictions, whether the predictions are based upon computer analyses or upon
a commentator's personal evaluation of early returns, so long as no attempt is
made to deceive the public as to the completeness of the returns or the methods
by which the predictions are formulated. Legislation protecting the franchise has
been applied only to cases where a person would be deprived of his vote by force
or fraud. Nor is analogy to cases of interference with voters by threats and intimida-
tion of much use; the objection remains that the broadcasts lack the element of
coercion.
A different view emerges, though, if these precedents are examined not in
terms of the acts by which the franchise is impaired, but in terms of the nature
of the impairment. The sponsors of the bills appear to be as concerned with the
supposed weakening of votes already cast as with the "rights" of those who
actually hear the -broadcasts. If indeed the "right" to vote has never been thought
infringed by merely informative or persuasive speech, it is well established that the
franchise includes the right to have a vote counted for its full strength. In Ex
Parte Siebold,35 for example, where an act of Congress dealt specifically with
breaches of duty by election officials, the Court, presumably aware that perhaps
no vote would go uncounted and no voter be denied a ballot, held ballot-box
stuffing to be the sort of invasion of constitutional rights that Congress may properly
punish. Convictions under statutes more generally protecting "constitutional rights"
have been as readily upheld, where tallied votes were "diluted" by false counts, "
forged and fictitious ballots,3 7 and refusals to count votes from particular areas.38
Although its decisions have been confined to infringements upon the right to
vote, the Court's opinions, if not its actual holdings, make its concept of the "vote"
quite plain: a vote is not a vote if its impact has been in any degree affected by
the addition or subtraction of other votes; for only in conjunction with other votes
does the exercise of the franchise have meaning. The Court's high regard for the
"undiluted" vote has been recently re-emphasized in decisions dealing with the
apportionment of state legislatures. Beginning with Baker v. Carr,39 the Court
has rejected its traditional view that the "weighting" of votes in state legislative
apportionment schemes was a "political" matter not properly subject to judicial
review. Declaring its willingness to investigate the relationships between appor-
tionment and the individual's franchise, the Court has relied squarely upon con-
siderations such as were mentioned most recently in Reynolds v. Sims:40 "diluting
the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic constitutional
rights . . . just as much as invidious discriminations based upon factors such as
race .. .or economic status.. .. 41
The implications of such language in the present context are clear. A differen-
tial of some three hours separates the Pacific time zone states from those in the
Eastern zone. Travellers to Hawaii would turn back their watches another two
hours. To the degree that Western votes may be cast not at all or may be cast
in support of different candidates than if the broadcasts had not been made, the
impact of votes already cast-both in the East and in the West- is altered.
34 United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944) (ballot stuffing); Guinn v. UnitedStates, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (enforcement of "grandfather clause"); Ex Parte Yarbrough,
110 U.S. 651 (1884) (physical assault).
35 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
36 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
37 United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).
38 United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
39 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
40 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
41 Id. at 566. Compare Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
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Despite the obvious differences between an outright vote theft and the conveying
of accurate information or bona fide speculations, an Eastern vote is no less impaired
by a discouraged Western vote than by one secreted from the ballot box. Thus,
the danger thought to inhere in current broadcasting practices is an impairment
of the franchise the like of which the Court has consistently condemned.
Although the harm is accomplished here only because responsible citizens
freely choose to change or to abandon their votes, government action ought not
be precluded against forces which in fact corrupt, simply because no fraud or
coercion is involved. Free and rational judgment is presumed of electors no more
than of jurors, yet we have long recognized that news coverage of criminal prose-
cutions may render a "fair" trial impossible.42 The language in Yarbrough and
Burroughs & Cannon clearly suggests that Congress may purge the nation's vital
processes from a broad spectrum of impurities. The serious question is not of its
basic power to do so but, more narrowly, whether particular legislation violates
any particular constitutional restriction.4"
III. Radio-Communications Regulation: Program Content
Beginning with the enactment of the Radio Act of 1927," congressional
regulations of the radio-communications media, including television, have been
premised upon the limited availability of broadcasting frequencies. Systematic
allocations have been thought essential to provide maximum beneficial use of
the available channels without interference among the broadcasts. 45
It is established, on this basis, that Congress, through the FCC, may super-
vise the content of programing, and is not limited to the control of technical mat-
ters. Pursuant to this authority, in addition to its regulation of licensees to assure
"balanced programming,"46 the FCC has by various means implemented Congres-
sional enactments dealing with the broadcast of obscene language,47 lotteries4 and
gambling information, 49 and deceptive quiz shows and other public contests.50
In the area of public affairs, the FCC has administered the statutory equal-
time requirements for political candidates,51 and has supervised the "fairness" of
broadcasting matters of public controversy. The Supreme Court has upheld the
equal-time provision as appropriately promoting the "broadest possible utilization"
of broadcast media,5 2 thus approving Congress' determination that a balanced
presentation of the issues properly necessitates the subordination of the broad-
casters' autonomy. Similar purposes were once thought to be served by a blanket
restriction restraint upon editorializing - the so-called "Mayflower doctrine" of
1941.53 However, after eight years of spirited dialogue among broadcasters, members
of Congress and the FCC, the doctrine was modified to require "fairness" in the
42 E.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
43 As Chief Justice Marshall said in another context, "Let the end be legitimate, let
it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit
of the constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819).
44 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
45 See statement of policy for the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1081 (1934),
47 U.S.C. § 301 (1958).
46 The bulk of the FCC's regulation of program content is done in terms of categories
rather than by scrutiny of particular programs. See generally the materials cited in note
14, supra.
47 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1958). The FCC applies the statute in license proceedings.
See Warren J. Currence, 34 F.C.C. 761 (1963).
48 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1958).
49 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (Supp. V, 1964).
50 KWK Radio, Inc., 34 F.C.C. 1039 (1963) (license revocation). In 1960, Congress
explicitly outlawed deceptive quiz programs. 74 Stat. 897 (1960), 47 U.S.C. § 509 (Supp.
V, 1964). The law has yet to be applied.
51 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. 315(a) (Supp. V, 1964).
52 Farmers Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 529 (1959).
53 Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 339-40 (1941).
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presentation of controversial subjects."' Subsequently, the fair presentation of
controversy became something of an affirmative duty, with the enactment in 1959
of section 315, obliging each licensee to "afford reasonable opportunity for the
discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance."' 5 The scope of this
new doctrine is still unclear. 56 Whatever its bounds may ultimately be, the Con-
gressional policy is clearly that the limited facilities for radio and television, unlike
other communications media,57 can be utilized in the public interest only if made
subject to a comprehensive and coordinated scheme of regulation.
IV. The First Amendment
"Congress shall make no law .... abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press. . .
A. Application to Radio-Communications
It has been said that the government "owns" frequencies, just as it owns the
facilities for distribution of the mail.58 In the sense that private enterprise is pre-
cluded from such status, the "ownership" concept may be apt. It does not follow,
however, that because the government has plenary power over the allocation of
frequencies, it may condition their use by private parties as it chooses, or that its
authority to determine what shall be broadcast is unlimited. Radio and television
broadcasts are within the first amendment's guarantee of free speech.59 The
Supreme Court has held that entertainment, as well as speeches and discus-
sions, is so protected. 0 There is therefore little basis for doubt that election results,
and predictions or opinions based thereon, would likewise be covered, be they-,,
classified arguendo as "news," "commentary," or even "entertainment." Further,
while the use of broadcast media is a "privilege" subject to conditions imposed
by the government,6 1 and while it is true that licensees acquire no vested rights to
broadcast except by the terms of the licenses granted, 2 the "privilege" label is none-
theless of minor significance. It is well settled that such a privilege may not be
withheld or conditioned to the detriment of rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
The press, for example, has the use of the mails at a subsidized second-class rate;
yet that concession may not be withdrawn simply because the government does
not approve the contents of a given publication.63
Moreover, past restrictions upon the subject matter broadcast by FCC licensees
are distinguishable from what is now proposed. No serious first amendment objec-
tions seem to have been raised against the restrictions upon broadcasts of lotteries
and gambling information. However, the information there suppressed relates to
practices otherwise criminal under federal or state law.64 Statutes prohibiting
54 EDITORIALIZING B'y BROADCAST LIcENsEES, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1253 (1949).
55 73 Stat. 557 (1959), 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (Supp. V, 1964).
56 One case, decided years prior to this latest enactment, hints of a requirement of
fair presentation of issues other than those which the public might be expected to resolve by
political action, indicating that atheists may be entitled to equal time to answer assaults on
their views by advocates of religion. See Robert Harold Scott, 11 F.C.C. 372 (1946).
57 In Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931), the Supreme Court held the sup-
pression of a newspaper because of previous defamatory publications to be "the essence of
censorship." Compare FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954) where,
although it was faced with an FCC rule curtailing "give-away" programs which, it affirmed,
was too broad, it forsook the clear opportunity to apply the Near rule and remained silent
on the question of censorship.
58 CUSHMAN, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 39 (1956).
59 American Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 374, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1953),
aff'd, FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954).
60 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
61 See Television Corp. of Mich., Inc. v. FCC, 294 F.2d 730, 733-34 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
62 48 Stat. 1081 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1958).
63 Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
64 A comprehensive scheme to keep lottery materials from the stream of commerce is
contained in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1301-04 (1958), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1302 (Supp. V, 1964).
Gambling information is elsewhere kept from being transmitted by wire or like media ex-
cept from and into states where gambling is legal. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) (Supp. V, 1964).
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deceptive or "rigged" quiz programs make the "intent to deceive" an essential
element of the offense.65
The analogies to be drawn between the instant bills and the statute prohibiting
the broadcast of obscene language are somewhat persuasive, despite the obvious
differences between obscenity and election commentary. Although the law is now
included in the Criminal Code, it was originally a part of the Communications
Act,68 and the FCC continues to apply it in license proceedings. 67 Like the legisla-
tion here considered, it proceeds upon the premise that at least substantial portions
of the public require, though they may not desire, insulation from a given class
of communications. In both cases, the assumption is reinforced by the peculiarities
of radio communications, by which the objectionable material is brought so rapidly
to so many that legal controls are thought necessary. But the case of Butler v.
Michigan will be of interest here. In that case, a Michigan statute was attacked
as violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The statute,
declaring it a misdemeanor to sell books tending to corrupt the morals of youth,
forbade sales to adults as well as children. It was invalidated as not reasonably
restricted to the evil with which it was meant to deal, for it reduced "the adult
population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children."8 9 Thus, where
the inability of the public, or any portion of it, to cope with a given class of
"speech" is suggested in defense of a given restraint, the measure will be carefully
examined, and the Court will not readily accede to the control of what adults
may read or hear.
It is submitted, nonetheless, that the present proposed legislation would with-
stand any assault grounded in the first amendment.
B. "Clear and Present Danger"
The first significant attempt to define a standard for evaluating restraints upon
the freedom of speech and press was undertaken by Justice Holmes in Schenck v.
United States.7 0 Speaking for the Court in affirming a conviction for distributing
leaflets opposing the draft, Holmes declared: "The question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent." 7' Holmes and Brandeis subsequently elaborated
upon the test in their dissent in Abrams v. United States:72
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very founda-
tions of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. . . . Only the
emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction
of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the sweeping
command, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech." 73
For a time the Court seemed willing to accede to reasonable legislative de-
terminations of what constituted a "danger" sufficiently serious and immediate
to justify the restraint. In Whitney v. California,7 4 with Holmes and Brandeis
65 74 Stat. 897 (1960), 47 U.S.C. § 509 (Supp. V, 1964).
66 48 Stat. 1091 (1934).
67 E.g., Walter J. Currence, 34 F.C.C. 761 (1963).
68 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
69 Id. at 383.
70 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
71 Id. at 52.
72 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
73 Id. at 630-31.
74 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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concurring separately, the Court affirmed a conviction under the California Syndi-
calism Act of one who had participated actively in the affairs of the Communist
Labor Party. The majority emphasized the "great weight" to be afforded the
legislature's judgment that membership should be punished, without a showing
of a clear probability that the defendant's activities would lead to violence.7 5 But
in Stromberg v. California,7 6 the Court dug more deeply into the supposed "danger"
of displaying a red flag as a symbol of opposition to organized government, and
reversed a conviction for the statute's failure to distinguish between peaceful and
violent opposition. And in De Jonge v. Oregon,77 a conviction for having presided
over a Communist Party meeting was reversed for lack of a specific showing that
the meeting was other than peaceable.
During the 1940's, it appeared that the first amendment guarantee of free
speech would be afforded something of a "preferred position," so that a law in
derogation thereof might be treated at the outset as, for all practical purposes,
presumptively invalid. Perhaps the strongest language occurred in Thomas v.
Collins:78
any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear public
interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present
danger. The rational connection between the remedy provided and the
evil to be curbed, which in other contexts might support legislation against
attack on due process grounds, will not suffice.70
This opinion of but four members of the Court may never have been the settled
view of a Court majority. 0
In 1951, Chief Justice Vinson undertook a review of the "clear-and-present-
danger" precedents in Dennis v. United States. L In upholding the Smith Act
convictions the majority adopted Learned Hand's formulation of a standard ap-
parently less stringent than Holmes and Brandeis might have approved: "In each
case, [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improba-
bility, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."8' 2
Hand's formula seems to call for an even weighing of the free speech interest
against the evil sought to be prevented. His approach seems to have guided the
Court to date, as it has upheld the Congressional restraint but required fairly strict
proof of the elements of the offense. Yates v. United States"5 reiterated the Dennis
approval of the Smith Act itself, but reversed several convictions, rather subtly
distinguishing between "incitement to action" and "advocacy of ideas," and finding
the latter not within the act.8 4
Just what the current "approach" may be, then, is difficult to say; while seem-
ingly a retreat from the "preferred position" view, it may also signify only the
Court's reluctance to settle too firmly upon a particular statement."' Uncertainty
may be somewhat mitigated in the present context, however, by testing the pro-
75 Id. at 371.
76 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
77 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
78 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
79 Id. at 530.
80 Cases dealing with the so-called "preferred position" of free speech are collected in
the opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89-97 (1949) (con-
cuiring opinion). He argues that it was never a settled doctrine of the Court. 336 U.S. at
94-95. 0
81 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
82 Id. at 510.
83 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
84 In 1961, for an additional example, two cases upheld the "knowing membership"
clause of the Smith Act, but divided on the facts peculiar to each on the question whether
knowledge of the unlawful aims of the Communist Party had been proven with sufficient
force. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203
(1961).
85 Frankfurter's concern in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) was principally that
"preferred position" was jargon, tending to foster "mechanical jurisprudence." 336 U.S. at 96.
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posed legislation against the words of Holmes and Brandeis. These are the basic
texts in the area, and suggest a constitutional measure perhaps more demanding
of legislation than the Court has unreservedly adopted.
C. Passing the Test
If it is true that broadcasting predictions and early returns appreciably change
or discourage votes yet to be cast, the result is a "substantive evil that Congress
has a right to prevent." The Court's discussions of the right to an undiluted vote
leave little doubt that it would regard the alleged "danger," if proved, a matter
of serious concern.
If scientifically respectable studies indicate that the broadcasts have significantly
affected voting patterns, the Court might well be persuaded to accede to the pro-
posed moratorium. James G. Hagerty, formerly President Eisenhower's Press Secre-
tary and a Republican campaigner for years, has frankly admitted that early claims
of victory, often supported by no evidence of any sort, were a part of Republican
strategy in the 1952 general elections, the unquestioned assumption being that
significant numbers of voters would be appreciably influenced. 6 The Court might
be persuaded to acknowledge, as well, the commentary of such social critics as
Max Lerner, who has argued that modern democratic man, beset by a multitude
of responsibilities and anxieties, requires a time for reflection - unassailed, if not
by the candidates themselves, at least by the counsels of soulless statistics -so
that he may cast a ballot worthy of the adjective "free.18 7
Lerner's contention points up a critical weakness in the argument, noted pre-
viously, that the harm is done by electors who freely choose to change or abandon
their votes. The bills presume that the people either will not or cannot evaluate
the broadcasts for themselves and are thus, so the argument runs, inconsistent with
orthodox democratic theory. This was essentially the problem in Butler v. Michi-
gan, as it is in cases where publicity is claimed to have precluded "fair" trials.18
Mr. Justice Frankfurter met the issue squarely in a fair-trial decision, with strong
words and his reflections merit consideration in the present context:
This Court has not yet decided that the fair administration of criminaljustice must be subordinated to another safeguard of our constitutional
system-freedom of the press, properly conceived. The Court has not
yet decided that, while convictions must be reversed and miscarriages ofjustice result because the minds of jurors or potential jurors were poisoned,
the poisoner is constitutionally protected in plying his trade.8 9
Moreover, the core of the problem Congress now faces is that it is thought "imme-
diately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time." There is no
time. The broadcasts are transmitted in the waning hours of the election day.
However well-publicized be the fallibility of mechanical computations and analyses,
it is their relative accuracy that laymen find most striking. The more "reliable"
they become, the less effective are non-legal efforts to mitigate whatever undue re-
liance their credentials may invite.
Perhaps the most deceptive objection to be overcome is not that the danger
is either unclear or remote, but simply that the direct suppression of these broad-
casts is not "necessary" to prevent it.
86 110 Cong. Rec. 18485 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1964) (quoted in remarks of Senator
Mundt). According to Senator Mundt, Hagerty favors "legislation to prevent television net-
works from announcing election returns while west coast polls are still open." Compare
the stand taken by Dr. Frank Stanton, President of Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.:
"there is no necessity for any such radical embargo on news of election results .... At that
point on election day when that determination is made, it immediately becomes news. And
the job of any news organization worth its salt is to report it." 110 Cong. Rec. 18478 (daily
ed. Aug. 12, 1964) (quoted in remarks of Senator Prouty).
87 Lerner, Beware of TV's Election Monster, Show, Sept. 1964, p. 29.
88 See note 42 and text accompanying note 68, supra.
89 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729-30 (1961) (concurring opinion of Justice Frank-
furter).
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It may be argued that Congress could avoid direct first amendment involve-
ments by forbidding the release of information until the last polling place had
closed. It is submitted that a choice between these alternatives -is properly a mat-
ter for the discretion of Congress. Under this proposal, news would be kept from
the public as effectively as if the broadcasters themselves had been silenced, and
perhaps more effectively. If no information were released anywhere until the last
polling place had closed, as Senator Prouty's bill now provides, subsequent delays
would be involved for programming the data into computers and for analyses by
commentators. In the interim, the public would be without news it would have
had more rapidly under the proposed broadcasting restrictions. Conceivably, the
releases could be timed so that results could be compiled, and predictions formu-
lated for broadcast as soon as the latest polls close. The practical difficulties would
remain, however. Such a law would have to be kept abreast of each development
in computer technology, to assure that no broadcast reach the public until after
the proper time. Enforcement would involve tracing each "leak" to a particular
poll-worker, rather than to a more easily identified broadcaster. At any event, the
proposal would result in no less effective a restraint upon the news, so that the
question is substantially one of method: if Congress may shroud the elections in
utter secrecy, may it not also seek the middle ground in conditioning broadcasts on
a moratorium of but a few hours' duration? Surely there would remain the formal
restraint upon free speech. Free speech, however, has never been treated as an
absolute right. The advocacy of both religious and secular causes has always been
subject to reasonable restrictions as to time and place.90 It has yielded, even though,
as in the Communism and criminal anarchy cases, the speech related to what may
well have been the speakers' most deeply cherished beliefs.
It is most difficult to justify the proposed broadcasting restrictions when
Senator Javits' bill is considered in the alternative. If all polls were closed at 11:00
P.M. Eastern time, news of the election would reach the people several hours
earlier than under the bills treated here, with no restraint upon speech. Unless
Western voters are to have fewer hours in which to vote than Eastern residents,
however, either Eastern polls must open later in the day (inconveniencing those
who normally vote early), or Western polls must open at an extremely early hour,
or all polls must remain open for 24 hours. Each variant involves its own peculiar
practical difficulties and expense. The question is thus, again, whether the broad-
casting restrictions are "necessary" for lack of a practical alternative, and the
judgment to be made is one for which Congress would seem best qualified.
V. Conclusion
It is submitted, then, that the first amendment will most probably not defeat the
proposed restraints upon radio and television broadcasters. The various safeguards
of liberty woven into the constitutional scheme are neither unqualified nor un-
related to one another. They must inevitably conflict, as when freedom of the
press is thought to infringe upon the right to a fair trial. No one doubts the im-
portance of a free press in the "open society"; yet none can dispute that all freedom
depends ultimately upon the franchise. That which corrupts the electoral process
ought not be blindly tolerated in the name of freedom. The ideal of "ordered
liberty" demands more sophisticated adjustments to strike a balance, in this con-
text, between the right of the "press" to inform the electorate, and each elector's
right to a rational, undiluted vote.
The critical questions are therefore only partly legal. The gravity of the danger
alleged, the necessity of the invasion of free speech for lack of a practical alterna-
tive - these are questions as much of fact as of law. Certain distinctions may be
drawn on the basis of legal standards; for example, the Court will presumably re-
90 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-5 (1940).
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quire a stronger justification for the suppression of election results than it will for
the silencing of predictions, since the former represent less of an intrusion upon
the good judgment of the electorate. Ultimately, however, any estimation of the
"danger" itself must rest upon a broad assessment of how people vote and why,
and of what protection the franchise requires under circumstances unique in our
history-an assessment, in short, of the national human condition. For such a
judgment, as for the choice between alternative means, there is ample precedent
both within and without the area of free speech for a judicious concession to legis-
lative prudence.
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